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Abstract
Deliberative models of democratic education encourage the discussion of controversial issues in the 
classroom (e.g., Hess, 2009); however, they tend to curtail conflicts for the sake of consensus. 
Agonism, on the other hand, can help support the deliberative model by attending to antagonism in 
productive ways (Ruitenberg, 2009). In this paper, I present how agonistic deliberation (the infusion 
of agonism into deliberation) can work as an account of the political that may help empower young 
people. The paper presents two classic democratic classroom practices— structured academic contro-
versy (SAC) and debate— together as examples of how agonistic deliberation can help students engage 
politically. This paper suggests that while deliberation can help students learn about political partici-
pation, agonistic deliberation (with its focus on conflict) has the potential to help students harness 
social frustrations into political action.
Submit a response to this article
Submit online at democracyeducationjournal.org/home
Read responses to this article online
http://democracyeducationjournal.org/home/vol25/iss1/2
At the turn of the 21st century, Francis Fukuyama (2006) proclaimed that liberal democ-racy was the ultimate solution to the world’s most 
difficult questions. Democratic educators, in kind, have touted the 
importance of classroom discussions in support of a Habermasian 
liberal democracy (e.g., Allen, 2006; Hess, 2009; Parker, 2006). In 
recent times, political polarization, racial divides, and terrorist 
threats seem to overshadow the kind of consensus that may be 
obtained through liberal democratic dialogue (e.g.,  
Is it possible for legislatures to engage in productive deliberations 
that yield consensus in order to avoid gridlock? Or can we find our 
common humanity through dialogue while extremist views 
propagate in the media?) As young people self- segregate through 
social media for solace, camaraderie, or ways to vent their 
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frustrations, one begins to wonder if consensus building through 
deliberative dialogue in democratic classrooms can help them 
engage politically.1 Put another way, might deliberative practices in 
1 See Berger’s (2009) distinction of political engagement from civic or 
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classrooms encourage students to become more interested and 
involved in politics or do the conversations simply make them 
more cynical? Readers of this journal are accustomed to articles 
that engage both educational philosophy and the field of curricu-
lum and instruction (e.g., Hyde & LaPrad, 2015; Parker, 2011; 
Peterson, 2014); this paper utilizes political philosophy alongside 
curriculum and instruction to explore these questions.
While teaching students to rationally engage in dialogue 
around controversial issues can help broaden their perspectives 
(Hess, 2009; Lo, 2015), these deliberations may subtly circumvent 
antagonisms that naturally fuel the political. For example, Hess 
(2009) suggested that as conflict arises, political tolerance, or “the 
willingness to extend important and significant rights (such as free 
speech) to people who are different from oneself,” (p. 16) is an 
essential aspect of highly diverse democracies. Political tolerance 
may be an important skill for students to acquire, but its connota-
tion suggests commonality is more important than disagreements. 
For students who already feel distant from the status quo, this 
emphasis on what we have in common may accentuate their lack of 
power in the current system, especially if they were not involved 
when the commonalities were first deduced. This sense of margin-
alization is evident in cases of bio- disasters, where individuals who 
suffered environmental accidents feel disenfranchised by the 
solution process because they did not have equal access to the 
deliberative processes that yielded the solutions (Shiva, 1999).
Drawing on the work of Mouffe and Ruitenberg, I show how 
agonistic deliberation may help empower students who feel 
marginalized by the status quo. With its emphasis on both conflict 
and conciliation, an agonistic deliberative model may expose 
students to inherent power struggles that exist in a pluralistic 
democracy. Before attending to how agonism and the political can 
help empower students, I first define agonism through a discussion 
of the political (via the works of Schmitt, Arendt, Rawls, and 
Habermas). Second, I discuss why agonism is essential to a 
pluralistic democracy. Third, to help educators understand how 
agonism can impact democratic education, I present it as a contrast 
to a generic deliberative model of democratic education. finally,  
I show how agonistic deliberation in the classroom may help 
empower students who feel disenfranchised by existing systems.
The Political in Two Substantiations
Before diving into how agonism is reflected in the political, let 
me suggest that pluralism is at the heart of agonism and the 
political. Pluralism, as defined by Berlin (1997), suggests a 
coexistence of diverse and competing ideological systems.  
A pluralistic democracy, therefore, is a society governed by a 
diverse populace, whose comprehensive ideals of what it means 
to “live well” is often in contention with one another. It is within 
this pluralistic democracy that conflict, conciliation, and the 
political exists.
Since “the political” is debated among political philosophers, 
in this paper, I draw upon the works of Schmitt, Arendt, Mouffe, 
Rawls, and Habermas to paint a picture of what I mean by the 
social engagement.
political. Different from politics— which are processes, practices, 
and discourses that seek to establish order in human existence— 
the political consists of natural conflicts that arise from pluralistic 
society (Mouffe, 1999). One can imagine that politics is the process 
of getting one’s neighbors to compromise on a speed bump 
installation down the street, whereas the political is the vehement 
disagreements among neighbors about whether there should be a 
speed bump to begin with. This conflictual antagonism within 
human relations is at the heart of the political. However, agonism 
differs from conflictual antagonism in that it attempts to harness 
this conflict for productive ends.
The Political as Conflict
Pushing the antagonistic envelope to extremes, Schmitt (2007) offers 
a criterion and expression of the political through a distinction: that 
of friend and enemy. Schmitt claimed that this distinction offers a 
way through which “all action with a specific political meaning can 
be traced” (p. 26). All things political, then, will include the ultimate 
tension between friend and enemy. Three ideas are crucial to 
Schmitt’s friend- and- enemy distinction. First, the friend- and- enemy 
distinction must be serious and severe, resulting always in the 
possibility (not necessarily the reality) of war and death of one’s 
enemy. “The friend, enemy, and combat concepts receive their real 
meaning precisely because they refer to the real possibility of 
physical killing” (p. 33). This leads directly to Schmitt’s second idea, 
where “the political entity is by its very nature the decisive entity”  
(p. 43). This means that the political is not associational or cohesive; 
it exists only where the decisive, and therefore divisive, resides. The 
third idea, by nature of the first, is that the enemy is “solely the public 
enemy, because everything that has a relationship to such a collectiv-
ity of men, particularly to a whole nation, becomes public by virtue 
of such a relationship” (p. 28). All things political are in the realms of 
the public, affecting a collectivity of people, which means that the 
enemy Schmitt alluded to can never just be the private adversary of 
one individual.
Schmitt (2007) contended not only that the political deals 
with the public but also that conflict is an essential aspect of the 
political existence. “As long as a state exists, there will thus always 
be in the world more than just one state. A world state which 
embraces the entire globe and all of humanity cannot exist” (p. 53). 
Schmitt argued that the existence of such a globalized world would 
negate the political. “What remains is neither politics nor state, but 
culture, civilization, economics, morality, law, art, entertainment, 
etc.” (p. 53). While he has admitted that “in a good world among 
good people, only peace, security, and harmony prevail” (p. 65), 
Schmitt does not believe this is possible, because humans are 
inherently divisive. Therefore, the political (or the friend- and- 
enemy distinction) exists as a part of humanity. In this interpreta-
tion of the political, Schmitt provided a very realistic account of the 
antagonism that exists in the world, without providing any lofty 
notions of peace or harmony. While Schmitt presented the political 
as a conflict- ridden entity, with no possible resolutions, Arendt 
focused on the unpredictable, yet creative, consequences of 
political conflict and action.
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In The Human Condition, Arendt (1998) outlined the funda-
mental aspects of the human condition from the perspectives of 
vita activa in three forms: labor, work, and action— of which action 
is explored in this paper. Arendt suggested, “Plurality is the 
condition of human action because we are all the same, that is, 
human, in such a way that nobody is ever the same as anyone else 
who ever lived, lives, or will live” (p. 8). This sameness in our 
differences drives us and conditions us in such a way that our 
actions are what make us human. At the same time, “though the 
common world is the common meeting ground of all, those who 
are present have different locations in it, and the location of one 
can no more coincide with the location of another than the 
location of two objects” (p. 57). This means that even though there 
may be some similarities among us (e.g., some of us live in the same 
cities), our distinct experiences make even these shared similarities 
uniquely individual. Put another way, even the things we have in 
common will never be exactly the same. These varying positionali-
ties in the world complicate and enrich our human experiences— 
and it is this complication that ultimately makes us human.
Like Schmitt, Arendt recognized the world is pluralistic by 
nature. This means conflict is inescapable. Also like Schmitt, 
Arendt believed that the political belongs in the public realm, 
because political actions impact all who are involved. However, 
unlike Schmitt, who has seen conflict as a never- ending reality of 
the political that should be preserved, Arendt saw conflict as an 
opportunity for human action. Arendt (1998) suggested that “an 
element of action, and therefore of natality, is inherent in all human 
activities” (p. 9). This means that humans are bound by actions 
through vita activa— our actions upon things and people are a part 
of the human condition and continuously determine the trajectory of 
human existence. Our actions are ever present, but they become 
problematic because they are inherently unpredictable and often 
irreversible. These actions can result in more unforeseeable 
conflicts, which propel the existence of the political.
Since we cannot always understand or guarantee the potenti-
alities of our actions, the consequences of these actions can result 
in conflicts that cripple or impede the possibility of future actions. 
So how might we get past these conflicts? Arendt suggested that 
forgiveness is the only way forward. She argued that a “possible 
redemption from the predicament of irreversibility— of being 
unable to undo what one has done though one did not, and could 
not, have known what he was doing— is the faculty of forgiving” 
(Arendt, 1998, p. 237). Forgiveness becomes the linchpin upon 
which human existence can continue and progress. “Without being 
forgiven, released from the consequences of what we have done, 
our capacity to act would, as it were, be confined to one single deed 
from which we could never recover; we could remain the victims of 
its consequences forever” (Arendt, 1998, p. 237). The power of 
forgiveness creates hope for impending renegotiations and 
provides future generations the freedom to act in courageous ways 
for the betterment of human existence.
At the same time, action (along with speech) requires a 
togetherness of people, where “[people] show who they are, reveal 
actively their unique personal identities and thus make their 
appearance in the human world” (Arendt, 1998, p. 179). And these 
dialogues should occur specifically in the public realm because the 
“revelatory quality of speech and action comes to the fore where 
people are with others and neither for nor against them— that is, in 
sheer human togetherness” (Arendt, 1998, p. 180). For Arendt, the 
political exists in this pluralistic negotiation and renegotiation of 
actions and speech. She was not promoting a harmonious exis-
tence where conflict is absolved, nor is she arguing for a world 
where conflict is preserved; instead, Arendt was suggesting that the 
public should be restored and preserved so that agonism and its 
outcomes can exist. As Arendt (1998) pointed out, an “emergence 
of society . . . from the shadowy interior of the household into  
the light of the public sphere, has not only blurred the old border-
line between private and political, it has also changed almost 
beyond recognition the meaning of the two terms and their 
significance for the life of the individual and the citizen” (p. 38).
For Arendt (1998), this disappearance of the public also means 
an eradication of the political. When the public loses its true 
purpose, as a place where individuals can “leave the household and 
enter the political realm, where all [are] equals” (p. 32), the political 
and the conflicts of pluralism lose an arena to exist. Arendt noted 
that people “have become entirely private, that is, they have been 
deprived of seeing and hearing others, of being seen and being 
heard by them” (p. 58). And given that “a [person] who [lives] only 
a private life, who like the slave was not permitted to enter the 
public realm, or like the barbarian had chosen not to establish such 
a realm, [is] not fully human” (p. 38), the overwhelming social 
nature of the modern world means that not only are people leading 
more private lives, they are becoming less human. Even as the 
private overtakes the public, it is important to note that the basis of 
the public and the political rests in the pluralistic nature of 
existence.
Like Schmitt, Arendt has taken an agonistic view of this 
pluralism. She suggested that “only where things can be seen by 
many in a variety of aspects without changing their identity, so that 
those who are gathered around them know they see sameness in 
utter diversity, can worldly reality truly and reliably appear” 
(Arendt, 1998, p. 57). Thus, conflict should never be cast aside or 
dismissed, because differences in ideology provide us an opportu-
nity to experience reality, as different views come into discussion in 
the public sphere. For both Schmitt and Arendt, conflict begets the 
political. More important, conflict is not destructive; instead, it is 
an unavoidable necessity that provides opportunities for actionable 
solutions in a pluralistic society.
The Political as Conciliation
In contrast to an conflictual approach to the political, Rawls (2005) 
has offered a more conciliatory interpretation of the political. In 
Political Liberalism, Rawls set out to answer whether it is “possible 
for there to exist over time a just and stable society of free and equal 
citizens, who remain profoundly divided by reasonable religious, 
philosophical, and moral doctrines” (p. 4). Similar to Schmitt and 
Arendt, Rawls recognizes the pluralistic nature of existence and its 
ensuing conflicts. But instead of articulating the political in terms 
of conflict, Rawls sees the political as a process of creating an 
overlapping consensus among reasonable and rational, but 
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incompatible, comprehensive doctrines. “In such a consensus, the 
reasonable doctrines endorse the political conception, each from 
its own points of view” (p. 134).
To achieve this overlapping consensus, Rawls (2005) sug-
gested that individuals must be in “a fair system of cooperation 
between free and equal citizens” (p. 22). This is achieved through 
the original position behind a veil of ignorance. Under this veil, 
citizens would be ignorant of any social or natural positioning that 
may give them advantages or disadvantages when bargaining with 
one another in the original position. The purpose of this original 
position is to “eliminate the bargaining advantages that inevitably 
arise within the background institutions of any society from 
cumulative social, historical, and natural tendencies” (p. 23).  
By creating an overlapping consensus in this egalitarian position,  
a well- ordered society can be unified as each comprehensive 
doctrine accepts the overlapping consensus in its own way. For 
Rawls, the political is not found in the conflict of pluralism; 
instead, it is a process of conciliation that is created through the 
rational reasoning between pluralistic ideals.
Furthermore, Rawls’s conception of the political is separate 
from moral and social conceptions. Rawls (2005) saw the political 
as a standalone concept that “can be endorsed by widely different 
and opposing though reasonable comprehensive doctrines” (p. 38). 
Since many reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral 
doctrines can still oppose one another, Rawls proposed a political 
domain where individuals’ “overall views have two parts: one part 
can be seen to be, or to coincide with, the publicly recognized 
political conception of justice; the other part is a (fully or partially) 
comprehensive doctrine to which the political conception is in 
some manner related” (p. 38). This articulation of the political is a 
deliberative public space where varying perspectives can come to 
agree on a conception of justice. But this means that irreconcilable 
aspects of comprehensive doctrines are left out of the political. 
Rawls’s notion of the political is removed from cultural, moral, and 
social backgrounds, and it requires individuals to be “part of a 
political ideal of democratic citizenship that includes the idea of 
public reason” (p. 62). When individuals practice public reason, 
they create the political “from shared fundamental ideas implicit  
in the public political culture in the hope of developing from them 
a political conception that can gain free and reasoned agreement in 
judgment, this agreement being stable in virtue of its gaining the 
support of an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines” (p. 101). In sum, this articulation of the political consists 
of reasonable, free, and equal individuals cooperating together in 
reciprocity to formulate a conception of justice as fairness— 
working together cooperatively in hopes of reaching consensus or 
at least narrowing differences. Whereas Rawls depended on an 
original position, removed from moral and social doctrines, to 
reconcile conflicts that arise from pluralistic existence, Habermas 
conceived of a conciliatory approach to the political that focuses on 
open discussion and deliberation.
While Habermas also saw the political as a process of deter-
mining principles of justice that all might agree on, his approach 
does not require the political domain to be separate from moral, 
philosophical, and social doctrines. Habermas’s articulation of the 
political focuses on political participation that can be realized in 
moral and cultural realms as well as the political domain (Ben-
habib, 1993). Once again, pluralism and conflicts of differences are 
at the basis of the political; however, the Habermasian process 
relies on practical discourses and deliberations as procedures to 
encourage reconciliation, instead of the original position. Like 
Arendt, Habermas suggested that practical discourse must occur 
in the public sphere. But unlike Arendt’s notion of the public, this 
“public sphere comes into existence whenever and wherever all 
affected by general social and political norms of action engage in a 
practical discourse, evaluating their validity” (Benhabib, 1993,  
p. 87). To put it in dialogic terms, the public sphere is “a theater in 
modern societies in which political participation is enacted 
through the medium of talk. It is the space in which citizens 
deliberate about their common affairs, and hence an institutional-
ized arena of discursive interaction” (Fraser, 1993, p. 110).
Since this deliberative model no longer separates an overlapping 
consensus from comprehensive doctrines, conflicts between these 
pluralistic views can threaten the political process of determining 
principles of justice that all can agree on. Even though Rawls and 
Habermas conceived of different procedures to reconcile conflicts of 
differences, both saw the political as a process of reaching an agree-
ment or mutual understanding. Meanwhile, Schmitt and Arendt 
embraced unresolved conflicts as an essential part of the political.
Attending to Agonism and the  
Political in Democratic Education
Deliberation by Contrast
In order to show how agonism and the political may contribute  
to democratic education, let me first present, by contrast, a generic 
deliberative model for democratic education. In his Educational 
Researcher article, Parker (2006) suggested that purposeful 
classroom discussions may help students develop what Allen 
(2004) called “a citizenship of political friendship” (p. 140), where 
students learn to view each other as political friends. Working with 
Aristotle’s (1999) conception of political friendship, Allen (2004) 
argued that students do not need to develop emotional affinity 
toward one another; however, being political friends does require 
students to respect one another as equals in order to obtain 
“rational consensus” (Habermas, 1990) through deliberation. 
Parker (2010) contended that classroom seminars and deliberations 
can function as miniature versions of democratic deliberations, 
where students are given opportunities to speak and listen to 
“strangers” (i.e., fellow citizens and peers) with reciprocity, 
humility, and caution. The ultimate goal is to help students develop 
a better sense of “others” so that there might be a greater degree of 
equity or commonality among them.
This deliberative model has aspects of a Rawlsian process— 
creating an overlapping consensus among reasonable and rational, 
but incompatible, comprehensive doctrines behind a veil Students 
are asked to view each other as reasonable and rational beings, 
whose opinions and views deserve to be heard. It also leans on 
Habermas’s (1984) notion that preconditions of the communicative 
process must be in place to ensure the rationality of arguments in 
deliberative discourses, especially since discourse only occurs when 
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one supposes “that a rationally motivated argument could in 
principle be achieved” (p. 42). Communicative rationality and 
reason2 are bound to the “internal relations between the semantic 
context of [people’s] expressions, their conditions of validities, and 
the reasons to (which could be provided of necessary) for the truth 
of statements or for the effectiveness of actions” [sic] (p. 9). In other 
words, students must all learn to communicate in a reasonable and 
logical manner.
Habermas (1993) pointed out that a discourse- centered 
“approach has the advantage of being able to specify the precondi-
tions for communication that have to be fulfilled in the various 
forms of rational debate and in negotiations if the results of such 
discourses are to be presumed to be rational” (p. 448). By partici-
pating in this deliberative process, students with different back-
grounds can help determine principles of justice and courses of 
action for the community without compromising their belief 
systems, as long as they are rational. Even in situations where 
conciliation does not seem possible, Habermas suggested that 
some compromise or consensus can be reached through delibera-
tion, especially if it is “the rationally motivated but fallible result  
of a discussion . . . that has come temporarily to a close because 
coming to a decision could no longer be postponed” (p. 450).  
This means that if students learn to respect one another’s rational 
motivations, compromises achieved through a deliberative process 
have a better chance of being honored. However, this process can 
only be successful if students participate rationally or accept that 
being rational within the system is the only way forward.
Many civic education scholars share a deliberative view of the 
political. Abowitz and Harnish’s (2006) review found that the 
deliberative model was a key category for contemporary discourses 
of citizenship. Civic scholars often view deliberative discourses as a 
way to promote liberal ideals in the classroom, because they 
provide an avenue for differing views to coexist within a public 
space (e.g., Callan, 2004; Gutmann, 1999; Hess and McAvoy, 2014; 
Parker, 2003; Youniss and Levine, 2009). While scholars may 
disagree on the philosophical basis for deliberation (e.g., Benhabib, 
1996), they believe deliberation is an important process of legiti-
mizing any decision- making. In order to help students understand 
how decisions are made rationally, schools can provide students 
opportunities to participate in this public process of exchanging 
ideas and making decisions (e.g., through the discussion of 
controversial issues [Hess, 2009]).
By presenting the political as a process of conciliation, 
democratic educators can help students learn to create a stable and 
rational democratic atmosphere through deliberation. Further-
more, practicing this political process requires students to have “an 
account of certain political virtues— the virtues of fair social 
cooperation such as the virtues of civility and tolerance, of 
reasonableness and the sense of fairness” (Rawls, 2005, p. 194). In 
other words, practicing and learning to deliberate (i.e., talking and 
listening to strangers) in the classroom might help students 
become more rational and reasonable.
2 See volume 1 of Habermas’s (1984) Theory of Communicative Action 
for a detailed discussion on communicative rationality and reason.
However, these conciliatory processes often overlook strong 
emotive structures that may be at the root of conflicts, which may 
be detrimental to eventual political engagement.3 Deliberative 
models also assume existing systems are rational, even if some 
students find them oppressive. While it is important for students to 
learn how to discuss controversial issues in a civil manner, the 
rational deliberative process may suppress antagonistic feelings 
that gave rise to the original conflict and leave students feeling 
demoralized or disenfranchised. In other words, students may feel 
like strangers are only willing to listen and talk about the issues that 
are rational, rather than to listen to and validate their feelings on 
difficult issues that are incommensurable with societal norms. 
These students may be discouraged due to their past negative 
experiences with a system that teachers hope they might engage 
with (Rubin, 2006). If marginalized groups do not feel like they 
have a seat at the Habermasian table, even when invited to the 
conversation, they may perceive the structure to be oppressive or 
unsympathetic to their views. Worse, feelings of disempowerment 
may be entrenched further by a deliberative framework that hopes 
to leave students with a “feel good” or “everyone is a winner” 
perception. This push toward consensus building or rational 
compromise may circumvent the very power structures that 
students should confront or challenge.
An example of this can be seen when students bring up issues 
around the #blacklivesmatter movement in the United States, only 
to be met with counter arguments about how #alllivesmatter. Even 
though the narrative of #alllivesmatter points to the democratic 
virtues of fair social cooperation, civility, and tolerance, it has the 
effect of belittling the call to shed light on specific systematic 
injustices met by Black Americans.4 Groups of individuals who 
feel oppressed by the system may view generic, all- encompassing 
movements as patronizing to their original cause. This is not to say 
that deliberation is not important; on the contrary, deliberation 
offers a way for students to see the importance of pluralism 
firsthand. However, a model of democratic education that 
seemingly proclaims #allperspectivesmatter may not be very 
empowering. An infusion of agonism into deliberations, on the 
other hand, may be able to capitalize on students’ differing 
perspectives for eventual political involvement.
Agonism Explored
Mouffe (2000) saw democracy as a system that allows for competi-
tion between interests, rather than a system of rational consensus 
building. Given the oppositional (or agonistic) nature of Mouffe’s 
conception of democracy, students could learn how to deal with 
these competing interests as a way to fully understand and partici-
pate in a democracy. By agonism, I draw on Ruitenberg’s (2009) 
work to mean an approach to the political that accepts the perva-
siveness of political conflict and seeks to channel that conflict 
positively, as opposed to minimizing or eliminating the conflict 
3 Studies have shown that open deliberation may actually depress 
political engagement (Delli Carpini, Cook, & Jacobs, 2004; Mutz, 2006).
4 See the interview with Judith Butler on “What’s Wrong with ‘All Lives 
Matter’?” (2015).
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rationally. Rather than ignoring emotive and irrational aspects of 
comprehensive doctrines, agonism in democratic education 
attempts to help students understand the conflicts behind incom-
mensurable beliefs and channel these conflicts for productive ends. 
Ruitenberg (2009) referred to this process as learning about 
“political emotions,” which can help guide or fuel students’ political 
thoughts and actions.
Given that “the political can be understood only in the context 
of the very present possibility of the friend- and- enemy grouping” 
(Schmitt, 2007, p. 35), teaching students to be unified citizens in a 
pluralistic society through an agonistic framework can seem 
counterintuitive. However, it is important to point out that agonism 
is different from antagonism. While antagonism seeks to avoid or 
conquer a hostile enemy, agonism anticipates to face and struggle 
with a dissimilar adversary. This distinction is important because 
“an adversary is a legitimate enemy, an enemy with whom we have 
in common a shared adhesion to the ethico- political principles of 
democracy” (Mouffe, 1999, p. 755). Instead of following delibera-
tive ideals of seeing a common humanity in the other, agonism 
suggests that even if students do not see others the same way they 
see themselves, they can still struggle with them as worthy 
adversaries. If educators can help students see people who are 
different from them as valuable adversaries instead of enemies, 
“conflict in and of itself is not a problem to be overcome, but rather 
a force to be channeled into political and democratic commit-
ments” (Ruitenberg, 2009, p. 272). Any conflicts that arise with 
one’s adversaries can be channeled into negotiations and action— 
the vita activa that is required for human existence— instead of 
sidestepped in favor of rationality.
A key to understanding this approach to democratic educa-
tion is that in agonism, “the prime task of democratic politics is not 
to eliminate passions nor to relegate them to the private sphere in 
order to render rational consensus possible, but to [mobilize] those 
passions towards the promotion of democratic designs” (Mouffe, 
1999, pp. 755– 756). This means students would not have to give up 
their comprehensive doctrines, set aside their emotive passions, or 
abide by rational preconditions in order to participate in the 
political. Unlike other deliberative models that require students to 
set aside their emotions in order to logically consider the rights of 
others, an agonistic deliberative model allows students to hold 
onto their passions.
Since students may not necessarily be rational in their 
negotiations (unlike in a generic deliberative model of democratic 
education), it becomes necessary for students to recognize people 
who are different from them as adversaries. “To come to accept the 
position of the adversary is to undergo a radical change in political 
identity, it has more of a quality of a conversion than of rational 
persuasion” (Mouffe, 1999, p. 755). While this type of conversion 
may occur through conversations or discussions, the end goal is 
not simply to be rationally persuaded but to undergo a deeper 
transformative understanding of the situation or the adversary. 
Instead of having students engage in political tolerance, which sets 
aside differences temporarily to logically consider the rights 
available to everyone, agonism asks students to transform their 
ideas about the world. Instead of just putting their difference on 
hold for the sake of human rights, the agonistic process encourages 
students to challenge their own positionalities (as well as one 
another’s positions) in the conflict. Through this process, students 
may learn that compromises are possible, but they are only 
“temporary respites in an ongoing confrontation” (Mouffe, 1999,  
p. 755). In other words, public deliberation does not reconcile 
differences as it does in Rawls’s view or create a logical haven as it 
does in Habermas’s views; instead, it is an arena through which 
ongoing conflicts are continuously renegotiated as people come to 
understand one another’s existences in deeper ways.
Agonism can help students learn how to negotiate and 
develop the capacity for renegotiation, rather than just skills of 
logical deliberation for compromise or consensus. For emphasis, 
negotiation is not the same as consensus and compromise. 
Consensus and compromise mean something like finding a point 
on which all can agree or agreeing that an agreement cannot be 
reached, whereas negotiations means coming to an actionable next 
step even if all are not satisfied with the results. For Habermas, 
compromise occurs when the conversation ends, because delibera-
tions naturally have endings. Negotiation is more than just a 
compromise, because negotiations allude to practical implications, 
with inferences of potential iterations of the current negotiated 
terms— a future time when the terms might lead to different 
practical implications. In a sense, all negotiations are temporary 
and strategic— temporary because, like Habermas suggested, 
conversations end, but strategic because the negotiable terms are 
not bounded by rationality. In a political process of constant 
negotiation and renegotiation, students might learn to practice 
Arendt’s notion of forgiveness, because action “needs forgiving, 
dismissing, in order to make it possible for life to go on by con-
stantly releasing [people] from what they have done unknowingly. 
Only through this constant mutual release from what they do can 
[people] remain free agents, only by constant willingness to change 
their minds and start again can they be trusted with so great a 
power as that to begin something new” (Arendt, 1998, p. 240). By 
actively facing and struggling with conflicts that exists in a 
pluralistic society, students can explore the underlining power 
relationships within those conflicts, and perhaps become empow-
ered in the process to take action, since negotiations yield action-
able plans.
Rather than to suggest that agonism is somehow better than 
deliberation, I wish to suggest that agonism can be coupled  
with deliberation to help make discussions in the classroom more 
meaningful for marginalized students. One way to incorporate 
agonism into the classroom is by implementing curricula that are 
centered on deliberation. But instead of focusing only on the 
consensus- making powers of logical deliberation, teachers can 
guide students into conversations for negotiation and transforma-
tion. “There is evidence that participating in controversial issues 
discussions can build pro- democratic values (such as tolerance), 
enhance content understanding, and cause students to engage more 
in the political world” (Hess, 2009, p. 32). At the same time, students 
might learn to practice agonistic deliberation with one another, 
where they are asked to bring forth their emotions and their sense of 
fairness and justice (or injustice) rather than to simply look for 
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logical commonalities between themselves and their peers. 
Agonistic deliberation might help create spaces where students can 
express their underlining ideas, emotions, and perspectives on 
controversial issues more openly.
An agonistic- deliberative classroom may provide students 
with opportunities to recognize, understand, and evaluate different 
belief systems, not just logically in order to develop political 
tolerance, but emotively in order to be fundamentally changed. It is 
possible that deliberation may achieve this goal without agonism, 
since perspective- broadening dialogue is at the heart of delibera-
tion and discussion. However, a generic deliberative model may 
further ostracize students who already feel like the system is 
against them. Agonistic deliberation, on the other hand, would 
take great care to validate students’ perspectives no matter how 
bizarre, jarring, or irrational they may seem. All perspectives 
would need to be taken into account when students begin to 
discuss actionable solutions to issues, not just the ones sanctioned 
by existing norms (e.g., anthropocentric ideas established by 
Western philosophy).
Through strategically crafted conversations, teachers may 
prompt students to consider the emotions that one may feel when 
they are oppressed by systemic injustices or come up with creative 
processes to negotiate and renegotiate norms to help transform one 
another’s ideas about an issue. For students who are marginalized  
by the status quo, these poignant conversations may help validate  
their feelings, realities, and ideas— even when they differ from the 
majority point of view. The ultimate goal of agonism is not just 
political tolerance but for future transformation— transformation 
of how everyone in the class perceives their realities. Even though 
students may see that transformation does not happen quickly, nor 
can it be accomplished without renegotiations, they may begin  
to understand the importance of forgiveness— of oneself and of 
others— for the injustices that will likely occur during (re)negotia-
tions. Agonism, when combined with deliberation, offers a more 
practical and realistic look at politics and democratic processes, 
rather than to cover the political in a veil of ignorance or expect 
everyone to behave as angels.5
Debate and Structured Academic  
Controversy: Agonistic Deliberation
The pluralistic nature of our society is nowhere more evident than 
in public schools, where students often interact with individuals 
who are different from them. Two classroom practices that can 
provide students with opportunities to engage in agonistic 
deliberation are debate and Structured Academic Controversy 
(SAC). Traditionally, both debates and SAC (but SAC especially) 
are seen as instructional strategies for deliberative models of 
education (see Parker, 2006). In the paragraphs below, I show how 
both strategies can be modified to become agonistic deliberation 
tools. While the two differ in their approaches to controversial 
5 Refer to James Madison’s famous Federalist #51 quote “If men were 
angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, 
neither external nor internal controls on government would be neces-
sary” (Hamilton, Madison, Jay, & Kessler, 2000, p. 344).
issues, the examples show how agonistic deliberation might help 
empower students.
Debates are often used in classrooms as engaging activities 
that get students to discuss contentious issues (Bonwell & Eison, 
1991; Chiodo & Byford, 2004; Levstik, 2008). They tend to elicit a 
competitive spirit among students that can trigger deeper political 
emotions. Even the procedural process of the debate mirrors 
constant conflict and dissonance as students offer arguments and 
rebuttals on a resolution. At the same time, the process of formulat-
ing logical arguments for a formal debate can minimize the 
emotive (and subsequently the agonistic) aspects of students’ 
positions. A well- crafted debate that seeks to infuse agonism into 
the conversation could ask students to draw up negotiations at the 
end of the debate, instead of ending on a definitive winner or loser. 
Understandably, by doing so, the activity may deviate from formal 
debate formats, but this alternative negotiations ending can help 
students draw on their political emotions and to consider not only 
the (sometimes combative) disagreements between the two sides, 
but also how to best move forward for both sides in the meantime. 
In this way, a stereotypically conflict- oriented activity like a debate 
can be transformed into an agonistic deliberation activity that may 
inspire students to further engage on the issue.
Another classroom practice that has potential to help students 
practice agonistic deliberation is a Structured Academic Contro-
versy (SAC). In its original form, a SAC introduces students to 
controversial issues that have been dichotomized by a yes or no 
question (e.g., Should our country accept Syrian refugees?); assigns 
students to one side of the issue; and asks them to present their 
arguments to the other side after some time of preparation 
(Johnson & Johnson, 1985). SAC is different from a debate because 
students do not prepare rebuttals to directly refute each other’s 
claims (and therefore, no direct conflict occurs). Instead, after both 
sides present their arguments, they come together to try and reach 
a consensus on the issue. Unlike debate (which is a good example 
of antagonism and conflict), SAC is a good example of the delibera-
tive process, where students are asked to logically deliberate an 
issue, mostly without their own opinions (remember that students 
are assigned to a side regardless of their actual feelings on the 
matter), and come to a consensus at the end. Students could also be 
asked to drop their assigned positions after the consensus step in 
order to discuss their actual opinions and feelings about the topic 
(Parker, 2011). However, as mentioned above, logical deliberative 
processes may leave students dissatisfied or disgruntled because 
they had to leave their feelings aside for the sake of coming to a 
consensus or compromise.
Even though the “drop your role” step broaches the political 
emotions that students may feel, agonism can be further infused 
into SAC by asking students to drop their roles prior to the 
consensus step. And instead of consensus, students can be asked to 
negotiate an actionable solution (rather than a consensus, since the 
goal is to highlight differences) to the current issue— a plan that 
everyone can get behind and participate in for the moment. This 
way, students have an opportunity to discuss the issue with not 
only the logical arguments that they have prepared but also their 
actual feelings on the topic— to engage with the issue as them-
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selves. It may be helpful for the teacher to remind students that  
all negotiations are temporary and that as situations change, the 
negotiated terms will inevitably shift. This process of negotiations, 
rather than consensus, may help transform students’ ideas and 
thinking about the issue, the factors surrounding the issue, or at 
least how they perceive possible solutions to the issue. By changing 
these steps in SAC, the deliberation becomes more practical, 
action- oriented, agonistic, and rooted in political emotions and 
can help students grapple with how to engage with political 
conflicts.
In agonistic deliberations (either through debates or SAC), 
teachers should allow students to convey their ideas and feelings in 
authentic ways and then challenge students to come up with 
negotiated action steps that address the issue. Rather than provid-
ing only rational evidence to logically back up their assertions, 
students can provide anecdotal stories or experiences that give rise 
to their thinking. Alternative narratives to ways of thinking about 
an issue could also be incorporated into agonistic deliberations. 
For example, when discussing how best to curb climate change, 
students may be allowed to present not only scientific data but also 
cultural narratives that provide insights into the issue. Or on issues 
of abortion, religious texts and ideology might be presented as 
part of the discussion. In both cases, it is valuable for students to 
voice their own perceptions and ideas— even at the risk of 
conflict— rather than to silence their perspectives. And all of this, 
on the way to negotiated action steps, since the end goal is empow-
erment and action.
Conclusion: Agonistic  
Deliberation in the Public Sphere
Besides providing students with a space for transformation 
through negotiations, agonistic deliberations offer educators one 
important lesson— a need to bolster the public arena. For all the 
disagreements about the political, one thing is constant: It can only 
exist in the public, because pluralism and its conflicts are mani-
fested through the gathering of different ideologies in a public 
space. Even though the public is where pluralism and the political 
come into being, Arendt (1998) lamented that “society always 
demands that its members act as though they [are] members of one 
enormous family which has only one opinion and one interest”  
(p. 39). This socialization creates normalized behavior, which 
“excludes the possibility of action” (p. 40) because pluralism is 
absolved. In becoming more socialized, people become less 
political. As Arendt warned, the “enlargement of the private, the 
enchantment, as it were, of a whole people, does not make it 
public . . . on the contrary, [it] means only that the public realm  
has almost completely receded” (p. 53).
Given that a goal of democratic education is to create future 
citizens who are enlightened and engaging, the waning of the 
public is a cause for concern. Students need opportunities to learn 
how to interact with one another for public good and not be 
isolated in an increasingly individualized world or socialized into 
their own segregated communities. The privatization of schools, 
universities, and political processes means that public spaces for 
the political need to be reclaimed. If these spaces vanish, where 
might future citizens face pluralism, deliberate contentious issues, 
and resolve to act? Democratic educators can help preserve  
the public arena by helping students practice agonism through  
the political so as to better understand its importance for our 
pluralistic democracy.
The future of a democracy will always rest in the hands of its 
citizens and how its citizens handle and navigate the conflicts that 
inevitably arise from pluralism. For young people to become 
more invested in politics, they need opportunities to engage with 
public interests that are inevitably inundated with differing 
viewpoints and conflicts. Even though agonism can seem to 
champion differences and dissent,6 at its heart, agonism hopes for 
the transformation of a future that will be better for everyone. By 
teaching students to harness their political emotions, navigate 
political conflicts, and negotiate actionable solutions, agonistic 
deliberation has the potential to empower students to engage 
with the conflict of differences that exist in a pluralistic society.  
If agonistic deliberation can help students learn to negotiate, 
forgive, and harness their political emotions for renegotiation, 
they may feel more empowered to enter into a political system that 
seem to have left them behind. Through this process, students 
may learn that while power may never be defused, the struggle is 
always worthwhile.
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